

23.4 Mitigation Measures

23.4.1 Purpose and Terms

If conduct is detected that meets the criteria specified in Section 23.3, the appropriate mitigation measure described in this Section shall be applied by the ISO. The conduct specified in Sections 23.3.1.1 to 23.3.1.3 shall be remedied by (1) the prospective application of a default bid measure, or (2) the application of a default bid to correct guarantee payments, as further described in Section 23.4.2.2.4, below, or (3) the application of the sanction described in Section 23.4.3 of these Mitigation Measures if (x) a Withdrawal-Eligible Generator located outside the Constrained Area engages in conduct that violates Section 23.3.1.2.1.1.2(a) of these Mitigation Measures that has an LBMP impact that exceeds the applicable threshold, or (y) a Withdrawal-Eligible Generator engages in conduct that violates Sections 23.3.1.2.1.1.2(b) or 23.3.1.2.2.6(b) of these Mitigation Measures that has an LBMP impact that exceeds the applicable threshold in the Day-Ahead Market. If a Market Party or its Affiliates (i) engage in physical withholding by providing the ISO false information regarding the derating or outage of an Electric Facility, or (ii) engage in uneconomic production or uneconomic withdrawal or do not operate a Generator in conformance with ISO dispatch instructions such that the prospective application of a default bid is not feasible, or (iii) if otherwise appropriate to deter physical or economic withholding or uneconomic production or uneconomic withdrawal, the ISO shall apply the sanction described in Section 23.4.3.

Terms with initial capitalization not defined in Section 23.4 shall have the meaning set forth in the Open Access Transmission Tariff.

23.4.2 Default Bid

23.4.2.1 Purpose

A default bid shall be designed to cause a Market Party to Bid as if it faced workable competition during a period when (i) the Market Party does not face workable competition, and (b) has responded to such condition by engaging in the physical or economic withholding of an Electric Facility. In designing and implementing default bids, the ISO shall seek to avoid causing an Electric Facility to Bid below its marginal cost.

23.4.2.2 Implementation

23.4.2.2.1 If the criteria contained in Section 23.3 are met, the ISO may substitute a default bid or bid parameter for a Bid or bid parameter submitted for an Electric Facility, or require the Market Party to use the default bid or bid parameter in the Bids it submits for an Electric Facility. The default bid or bid parameter shall establish a maximum or minimum value for one or more components of the submitted Bid or Bid parameters, equal to a reference level for that component determined as specified in Section 23.3.1.4.

23.4.2.2.1.1 If the substitution of a default bid or bid parameter(s) for any portion of the Incremental Energy Bid curve submitted for an Energy Storage Resource would result in a mitigated energy curve that is not consistent with the Energy Storage Resource's Roundtrip Efficiency, then the default bid or bid parameter(s) to inject Energy will be adjusted to the minimum extent necessary to ensure the difference between bids to withdraw Energy and bids to inject Energy incorporate the Energy Storage Resource's Roundtrip Efficiency.

23.4.2.2.2 An Electric Facility subject to a default bid shall be paid the LBMP or other market clearing price applicable to the output from the facility.

Accordingly, a default bid shall not limit the price that a facility may receive unless the default bid determines the LBMP or other market clearing price applicable to that facility.

23.4.2.2.3 If an Electric Facility is mitigated using the automated mitigation procedures described in Section 23.3.2.2.3 of these mitigation measures to a default bid for an Incremental Energy Bid other than a default bid determined as specified in Section 23.3.1.4, the Electric Facility shall receive an additional payment for each interval in which such mitigation occurs equal to the product of: (i) the amount of Energy in that interval scheduled or dispatched to which the incorrect default bid was applied; (ii) the difference between (a) the lesser of the applicable unmitigated bid and a default bid determined in accordance with Section 23.3.1.4, and (b) the applicable LBMP or other relevant market price in each such interval, if (a) greater than (b), or zero otherwise; and (iii) the length of that interval.

If an Electric Facility is mitigated to a default bid for a Start-Up Bid or a Minimum Generation Bid other than a default bid determined as specified in Section 23.3.1.4 of these Mitigation Measures, or if an Electric Facility is mitigated to a default bid for an Incremental Energy Bid other than a default bid determined as specified in Section 23.3.1.4 of these Mitigation Measures based on mitigation procedures other than the automated mitigation procedures described in Section 23.3.2.2.3 of these Mitigation Measures, then the ISO shall determine

if the Bids would have failed the relevant conduct test(s) if correctly determined default bids had been used. The ISO shall then restore any original (as-submitted) Bid(s) that would not have failed the relevant conduct test(s) if correctly determined default bids had been used, and use the restored Bid(s) to determine a settlement. Otherwise, the ISO shall use the Generator's correct or corrected default bid(s) to determine a settlement.

23.4.2.2.4 Except as may be specifically authorized by the Commission:

23.4.2.2.4.1 The ISO shall not use a default bid to determine revised market clearing prices for periods prior to the imposition of the default bid.

23.4.2.2.4.2 The ISO shall only be permitted to apply default bids to determine revised real-time guarantee payments to a Market Party in accordance with the provisions of Section 23.3.3.3 of these Mitigation Measures.

23.4.2.2.5 Automated implementation of default bid mitigation measures shall be subject to the following requirements.

23.4.2.2.5.1 Automated mitigation measures shall not be applied if the price effects of the measures would cause the average day-ahead energy price in the mitigated locations or zones to rise over the entire day.

23.4.2.2.5.2 Automated mitigation measures as specified in Section 23.3.2.2.3 shall be applied to Minimum Generation Bids and start-up costs Bids meeting the applicable conduct and impact tests. When mitigation of Minimum Generation Bids is warranted, mitigation shall be imposed from the first hour in which the impact test is met to the last hour in which the impact test is met, or for the duration of the mitigated Generator's minimum run time, whichever is longer.

23.4.2.2.5.3 The posting of the Day-Ahead schedule may be delayed if necessary for the completion of automated mitigation procedures.

23.4.2.2.5.4 Bids not mitigated under automated procedures shall remain subject to mitigation by other procedures specified herein as may be appropriate.

23.4.2.2.5.5 The role of automated mitigation measures in the determination of Day-Ahead market clearing prices is described in Section 17.1.3 of Attachment B of the ISO Services Tariff.

23.4.2.2.6 A Real-Time automated mitigation measure shall remain in effect for the duration of any hour in which there is an RTC interval for which such mitigation is deemed warranted.

23.4.2.2.7 A default bid shall not be imposed on a Generator that is not in the New York Control Area and that is electrically interconnected with another Control Area.

23.4.3 Sanctions

23.4.3.1 Types of Sanctions

The ISO may impose financial penalties on a Market Party in amounts determined as specified below.

23.4.3.2 Imposition

The ISO shall impose financial penalties as provided in this Section 23.4.3, if the ISO determines in accordance with the thresholds and other standards specified in this Attachment H that: (i) a Market Party has engaged in physical withholding, including providing the ISO false information regarding the derating or outage of an Electric Facility; or (ii) a Market Party or its Affiliates have engaged in uneconomic production; or (iii) a Market Party or its Affiliates have

engaged in uneconomic withdrawal; or (iv) a Market Party or its Affiliates have failed to follow the ISO's dispatch instructions in real-time, resulting in a different output level than would have been expected had the Market Party's or the Affiliate's generation or Internal Controllable Line followed the ISO's dispatch instructions, and such conduct has caused a material increase in one or more prices or guarantee payments in an ISO Administered Market; or (v) a Market Party has made unjustifiable changes to one or more operating parameters of a Generator or Internal Controllable Line that reduce its ability to provide Energy or Ancillary Services; or (vi) a Load Serving Entity has been subjected to a Penalty Level payment in accordance with Section 23.4.4 below; or (vii) a Market Party has submitted inaccurate fuel type or fuel price or opportunity cost information that is used by the ISO in the development of a Resource's reference level, where the inaccurate reference level that is developed, in turn, directly or indirectly impacts guarantee payments or market clearing prices paid to the Market Party; or (viii) a Market Party has submitted inaccurate information other than fuel type or fuel price information that is used by the ISO in the development of a Resource's reference level, where the inaccurate reference level that is developed, in turn, directly or indirectly impacts guarantee payments or market clearing prices paid to the Market Party; or (ix) the opportunity to submit Incremental Energy Bids into the real-time market that exceed Incremental Energy Bids made in the Day-Ahead Market or mitigated Day-Ahead Incremental Energy Bids where appropriate, has been revoked for a Market Party's Generator or Internal Controllable Line pursuant to Sections 23.4.7.2 and 23.4.7.3 of these Mitigation Measures; or (x) a Market Party has engaged in economic withholding in the Day-Ahead Market by submitting Incremental Energy Bids that violate the conduct thresholds specified in Sections 23.3.1.2.1.1.2(b) or 23.3.1.2.2.6(b) of these Mitigation Measures and cause an LBMP impact that exceeds the applicable threshold; or (xi) a Market Party has engaged in

economic withholding of a Withdrawal-Eligible Generator located outside the Constrained Area by submitting Incremental Energy Bids that violate the conduct threshold specified in Section 23.3.1.2.1.1.2(a) of these Mitigation Measures and cause an LBMP impact that exceeds the applicable threshold.

23.4.3.3 Base Penalty Amount

23.4.3.3.1 Except for financial penalties determined pursuant to Sections 23.4.3.3.2, 23.4.3.3.3, and 23.4.3.3.4 below, financial penalties shall be determined by the product of the Base Penalty Amount, as specified below, times the appropriate multiplier specified in Section 23.4.3.4:

MW meeting the standards for mitigation during Mitigated Hours * Penalty market-clearing price.

23.4.3.3.1.1 For purposes of determining a Base Penalty Amount, the term “Mitigated Hours” shall mean: (i) for a Day-Ahead Market, the hours in which MW were withheld; (ii) for a Real-Time Market, the hours in the calendar day in which MW were withheld; and (iii) for load Bids, the hours giving rise to Penalty Level payments.

23.4.3.3.1.1.1 For purposes of determining a Base Penalty Amount for economic withholding related to Bids that the ISO evaluates as a price spread for purposes of scheduling and dispatch, the term “Mitigated Hours” shall instead mean:

(i) for the Day-Ahead Market, for Withdrawal-Eligible Generators located outside the Constrained Area, all hours of the day in which an LBMP impact is determined after the NYISO replaces all Incremental Energy Bids that violate the

conduct thresholds specified in Sections 23.3.1.2.1.1.2(a) or 23.3.1.2.1.1.2(b) of these Mitigation Measures with reference levels; or

(ii) for the Day-Ahead Market, for Withdrawal-Eligible Generators located in the Constrained Area, all hours of the day in which an LBMP impact is determined after the NYISO replaces all Incremental Energy Bids that violate the conduct thresholds specified in Section 23.3.1.2.2.6(b) of these Mitigation Measures with reference levels; or

(iii) for the Real-Time Market, for Withdrawal-Eligible Generators located outside the Constrained Area, all hours of the day in which an LBMP impact is determined after the NYISO replaces all Incremental Energy Bids that violate the conduct thresholds specified in Sections 23.3.1.2.1.1.2(a) of these Mitigation Measures with reference levels.

In each of the above cases, the “MW meeting the standards for mitigation during Mitigated Hours” shall be all scheduled MW.

23.4.3.3.1.2 For purposes of determining a Base Penalty Amount, the term “Penalty market-clearing price” shall mean: (i) for a withholding seller, the LBMP or other market-clearing price at the generator bus of the withheld resource or the Internal Controllable Line injection bus where impact was determined (or in the relevant Load Zone, if a clearing price is not calculated at the generator bus or Internal Controllable Line bus); and (ii) for a Load Serving Entity, its zonal LBMP.

23.4.3.3.1.2.1 For purposes of determining a Base Penalty Amount for economic withholding related to Bids that the ISO evaluates as a price spread for purposes of scheduling and dispatch, the “Penalty market-clearing price” shall instead

mean the difference between the market clearing price that was set and the market clearing price would instead be determined if reference levels are substituted for conduct-failing Incremental Energy Bids.

23.4.3.3.2 Uneconomic Production, Uneconomic Withdrawal, and Failure to Follow ISO Dispatch Instructions

23.4.3.3.2.1 The financial penalty for uneconomic production conduct that violates the thresholds set forth in 23.3.1.3.1.1 of these Mitigation Measures or uneconomic withdrawal conduct that violates the thresholds set forth in 23.3.1.3.2.1 of these Mitigation Measures, and is determined to have had impact in accordance with Section 23.3.2.1 of these Mitigation Measures, shall be:

- (i) One and a half times the product of (a) the absolute value of the Congestion Component of the Day-Ahead LBMP or Real-Time LBMP and (b) the MW meeting the standards for mitigation during the Mitigated Hour(s); or
- (ii) One and a half times the increase in Bid Production Cost guarantee payments or Day-Ahead Margin Assurance Payments earned by the Generator or by the Market Party and its Affiliates during the Mitigated Hour(s), or on the market day during which the Mitigated Hour(s) occurred if related to a daily payment.

For purposes of determining the financial penalty for uneconomic production or uneconomic withdrawal in this Section 23.4.3.3.2.1, the term “Mitigated Hour(s)” shall mean the hours in which uneconomic production or uneconomic withdrawal conduct occurred.

23.4.3.3.2.2 The financial penalty for failure to follow ISO’s dispatch instructions in real-time, resulting in real-time operation at a different output level than would

have been expected had the Market Party's or the Affiliate's generation or Internal Controllable Line followed the ISO's dispatch instructions, if the conduct violates the thresholds set forth in Sections 23.3.1.1.1.2, or 23.3.1.3.1.2 of these Mitigation Measures, and if a Market Party or its Affiliates, or at least one Generator or Internal Controllable Line, is determined to have had impact in accordance with Section 23.3.2.1 of these Mitigation Measures, shall be:

One and a half times the estimated additional real time LBMP and Ancillary Services revenues earned by the Generator or Internal Controllable Line, or Market Party and its Affiliates, meeting the standards for impact during intervals in which MW were not provided or were overproduced.

23.4.3.3.3 Submission of Inaccurate Fuel Type, Fuel Price or Opportunity Cost Information

If inaccurate fuel type, fuel price or opportunity cost information was submitted by or for a Market Party, and the reference level that the ISO developed based on that inaccurate information impacted guarantee payments or market clearing prices paid to the Market Party in a manner that violates the thresholds specified in this Section 23.4.3.3.3, then, following consultation with the Market Party regarding the appropriate fuel type, fuel price or opportunity cost, the ISO shall apply the penalty set forth below, unless: (i) the Market Party shows that the information was submitted in compliance with the requirements of Section 4.1.9 of the ISO Services Tariff (Cost Recovery for Units Responding to Local Reliability Rules Addressing Loss of Generator Gas Supply), or (ii) the total penalty calculated for a particular Day-Ahead or Real-Time Market day is less than \$5,000, in which case the ISO will not apply a penalty.

23.4.3.3.3.1 Inaccurate Fuel Type and/or Fuel Price Information Conduct and Market Impact Tests

23.4.3.3.3.1.1 Inaccurate Fuel Type and/or Fuel Price Information Conduct Test and Inaccurate Opportunity Cost Conduct Test

Inaccurate Fuel Price/Type Conduct Test—using the higher of (a) a revised reference level calculated using the Generator’s actual fuel costs, or (b) the reference level that would have been in place for the Generator but for the submission of inaccurate fuel type and/or fuel price information, test the Bids to determine if they violate the relevant conduct threshold in accordance with the appropriate provision(s) of Section 23.3.1.2 of these Mitigation Measures.

Inaccurate Opportunity Cost Conduct Test—using the higher of (a) a revised reference level calculated using the Generator’s [or Internal Controllable Line’s](#) demonstrated opportunity cost, or (b) the reference level that would have been in place for the Generator [or Internal Controllable Line](#) but for the submission of inaccurate opportunity cost information, test the Bids to determine if they violate the relevant conduct threshold in accordance with the appropriate provision(s) of Section 23.3.1.2 of these Mitigation Measures.

23.4.3.3.3.1.2 Inaccurate Fuel Type and/or Fuel Price Information Impact Test and Inaccurate Opportunity Cost Conduct Test

Inaccurate Fuel Price/Type Impact Test—using the higher of (a) a revised reference level calculated using the Generator’s actual fuel costs, or (b) the reference level that would have been in place for the Generator but for the submission of inaccurate fuel type and/or fuel price information, test the Bids for both LBMP and guarantee payment impact in accordance with the appropriate provisions of Section 23.3.2.1 of these Mitigation measures.

Inaccurate Opportunity Cost Impact Test—using the higher of (a) a revised reference level calculated using the Generator’s [or Internal Controllable Line’s](#) demonstrated opportunity cost, or (b) the reference level that would have been in place for the Generator [or Internal Controllable Line](#) but for the submission of inaccurate opportunity cost information, test the Bids for both LBMP and guarantee payment impact in accordance with the appropriate provisions of Section 23.3.2.1 of these Mitigation measures.

23.4.3.3.3.1.2.1 The ISO shall perform the guarantee payment impact tests for Generators that are committed in the Day-Ahead Market for local reliability or in the Real-Time Market via an SRE, and that are not located in a Constrained Area, at the 50% increase Constrained Area threshold specified in Section 23.3.2.1.2 of these Mitigation Measures.

23.4.3.3.3.1.3 Day-Ahead Reliability Commitments in a Constrained Area

Consistent with Section 23.5.2 of these Mitigation Measures, the conduct and impact thresholds for In-City Generators committed in the Day-Ahead Market for local reliability shall each be zero.

23.4.3.3.3.2 Inaccurate Fuel Type and/or Fuel Price and/or Opportunity Cost Information Penalty Calculation

If the results of the impact test indicate that the Market Party’s Bid had either LBMP or guarantee payment impact then the ISO shall charge the Market Party a penalty, calculated separately for the Day-Ahead Market and the Real-Time Market for each penalized day, for each of its Generators [and/or Internal Controllable Lines](#), as follows:

Daily Penalty (for either the Day-Ahead Market or the Real-Time Market) =

$$\begin{aligned} & \text{Multiplier} \times \max [\Sigma_g \blacktriangle \text{BPCG payment}_g + \\ & \Sigma_h \Sigma_g (\text{Market Party MWh}_{gh} \times \blacktriangle \text{LBMP@PTID}_{gh}) + \\ & \max (\Sigma_h \text{TCC Revenue Calc for Market Party}_h, 0), 0] \end{aligned}$$

Where:

g = each of the Market Party's Generators and/or Internal Controllable Lines.

h = (a) for the purpose of calculating Day-Ahead Market penalties for a given day, h is each hour of that day in which inaccurate fuel type or fuel price or opportunity cost information was supplied in the Day-Ahead Market for any of the Market Party's Generators or Internal Controllable Lines, provided that one of the Day-Ahead Bids in that hour "h" for at least one of the Market Party's Generators or Internal Controllable Lines failed an LBMP or guarantee payment impact test described in Section 23.4.3.3.3.1.2 of these Mitigation Measures, or
(b) for the purpose of calculating Real-Time Market penalties for a given day, h is each hour of that day in which inaccurate fuel type or fuel price or opportunity cost information was supplied in the Real-Time Market for any of the Market Party's Generators or Internal Controllable Lines, provided that one of the Real-Time Bids in that hour "h" for at least one of the Market Party's Generators or Internal Controllable Lines failed an LBMP or guarantee payment impact test described in Section 23.4.3.3.3.1.2 of these Mitigation Measures.

Multiplier = a factor of 1.0 or 1.5. Determined as specified below.

For violations related to fuel price and/or fuel type submissions, the ISO shall use a 1.0 Multiplier if the Market Party has not been penalized for inaccurately reporting fuel type or fuel price information over the 6 months prior to the market-day for which the penalty is being calculated. In all other cases the ISO shall use a 1.5 Multiplier.

For violations related to opportunity cost submissions, the ISO shall use a 1.0 Multiplier if the Market Party has not been penalized for inaccurately reporting opportunity cost information over the 6 months prior to the market-day for which the penalty is being calculated. In all other cases the ISO shall use a 1.5 Multiplier.

▲ $BPCG\ payment_g = (a)$ for the purpose of calculating Day-Ahead Market penalties for a given day, the change in the Day-Ahead Market guarantee payment for that day for Generator [or Internal Controllable Line](#) g determined when the ISO performs the guarantee payment impact test in accordance with Section 23.3.2.1.2 of these Mitigation Measures, or (b) for the purpose of calculating Real-Time Market penalties for a given day, the change in the Real-Time guarantee payment for that day for Generator [or Internal Controllable Line](#) g determined when the ISO performs the guarantee payment impact test in accordance with Section 23.3.2.1.2 of these Mitigation Measures.

Market Party $MWh_{gh} = (a)$ for the purpose of calculating Day-Ahead Market penalties, the MWh of Energy scheduled in the Day-Ahead Market for Generator [or Internal Controllable Line](#) g in hour h ; or (b) for the purpose of calculating Real-Time Market penalties, the maximum of (1) the MWh of Energy

that Generator [or Internal Controllable Line](#) g was scheduled to produce in the Day-Ahead Market in hour h, or (2) the MWh of Energy that Generator [or Internal Controllable Line](#) g was scheduled to produce in the Real-Time Market in hour h, or (3) the MWh of Energy produced by Generator [or Internal Controllable Line](#) g that was scheduled to produce energy in hour h in the Real-Time Market.

▲ $LBMP@PTID_{gh} =$ (a) for the purpose of calculating Day-Ahead Market penalties, the change in the Day-Ahead Market LBMP for hour h at the location of Generator [or Internal Controllable Line](#) g, as determined when the ISO performs the relevant LBMP impact test in accordance with Section 23.3.2.1.1 or 23.3.2.1.3 of these Mitigation Measures, or (b) for the purpose of calculating Real-Time Market penalties, the change in the real-time LBMP for hour h at the location of Generator [or Internal Controllable Line](#) g, as determined when the ISO performs the relevant LBMP impact test in accordance with Section 23.3.2.1.1 or 23.3.2.1.3 of these Mitigation Measures.

TCC Revenue Calc for Market Party_h = (a) for the purpose of calculating Day-Ahead Market penalties, the change in TCC Revenues that the Market Party receives for hour h, determined when the ISO performs the relevant Day-Ahead Market LBMP impact test, or (b) for the purpose of calculating Real-Time Market penalties, zero.

23.4.3.3.4 Virtual Bidding Penalties

23.4.3.3.4.1 If the opportunity to submit Incremental Energy Bids into the Real-Time Market that exceed Incremental Energy Bids made in the Day-Ahead Market or mitigated Day-Ahead Incremental Energy Bids where appropriate, has

been revoked on a Market Party's Generator [or Internal Controllable Line](#) pursuant to Sections 23.4.7.2 and 23.4.7.3 of these Mitigation Measures, then the following virtual market penalty may be imposed on the Market Party:

Virtual market penalty = (Virtual Load MWs) * (Amount by which the hourly integrated real-time LBMP exceeds the day-ahead LBMP applicable to the Virtual Load MWs)

WHERE:

Virtual Load MWs are the scheduled MWs of Virtual Load Bid by the Market Party in the hour for which an increased real-time Bid for the Market Party's Generator [or Internal Controllable Line](#) failed the test specified in Section 23.4.7.2 of these Mitigation Measures; and

LBMP is the LBMP at which the Virtual Load MWs settled in the Day-Ahead and real-time Markets.

23.4.3.3.4.2 If the opportunity to submit Incremental Energy Bids into the Real-Time Market that are less than the Incremental Energy Bids submitted in the Day-Ahead Market (or the mitigated Day-Ahead Incremental Energy Bids where appropriate), has been revoked on a Market Party's Generator pursuant to Sections 23.4.7.2 and 23.4.7.3 of these Mitigation Measures, then the following virtual market penalty may be imposed on the Market Party:

Virtual market penalty = (Virtual Supply MWs) * (Amount by which the hourly integrated real-time LBMP is less than the day-ahead LBMP applicable to the Virtual Supply MWs)

WHERE:

Virtual Supply MWs are the scheduled MWs of Virtual Supply Bid by the Market Party in the hour for which a reduced real-time Bid for the Market Party's Generator failed the test specified in Section 23.4.7.2 of these Mitigation Measures; and

LBMP is the LBMP at which the Virtual Supply MWs settled in the Day-Ahead and real-time Markets.

23.4.3.3.5 No Revisions to Real-Time LBMPs

Real-Time LBMPs shall not be revised as a result of the imposition of a financial obligation as specified in this Section 23.4.3.3, except as may be specifically authorized by the Commission.

23.4.3.4 Multipliers

The Base Penalty Amount specified in Section 23.4.3.3.1 shall be subject to the following multipliers:

23.4.3.4.1 For the first instance of a type of conduct by a Market Party meeting the standards for mitigation, the multiplier shall be one (1).

23.4.3.4.2 For the second instance within the current or the two immediately previous capability periods of substantially similar conduct in the same market by a Market Party or its Affiliates, the multiplier shall be one (1),

23.4.3.4.3 For the third instance within the current or the two immediately previous capability periods of substantially similar conduct in the same market by a Market Party or its Affiliates, the multiplier shall be two (2),

23.4.3.4.4 For the fourth or any additional instance within the current or immediately previous capability period of substantially similar conduct in the same market by a Market Party or its Affiliates, the multiplier shall be three (3).

23.4.3.5 Dispute Resolution

23.4.3.5.1 Parties with of disputes arising from or relating to the imposition of a sanction under this Section 23.4.3 may utilize the dispute resolution provisions of the ISO Services Tariff. The scope of any such proceeding shall include resolution of any dispute as to legitimate justifications, under applicable legal, regulatory or policy standards, for any conduct that is asserted to warrant a penalty. Any or all of the issues in any such proceeding may be resolved by agreement of the parties.

23.4.3.5.2 Payment of a financial penalty may be withheld pending conclusion of any arbitration or other alternate dispute resolution proceeding instituted pursuant to the preceding paragraph and any petition to FERC for review under the Federal Power Act of the determination in such dispute resolution proceeding; provided, however, that interest at the ISO's average cost of borrowing shall be payable on any part of the penalty that is withheld, and that is determined to be payable at the conclusion of the dispute resolution/FERC review process from the date of the infraction giving rise to the penalty to the date of payment. The exclusive remedy for the inappropriate imposition of a financial penalty, to the exclusion of any claim for damages or any other form of relief, shall be a determination that a penalty should not have been imposed, and a refund with interest of paid amounts

of a penalty determined to have been improperly imposed, as may be determined in the applicable dispute resolution proceedings.

23.4.3.5.3 This Section 23.4.3 shall not be deemed to provide any right to damages or any other form of relief that would otherwise be barred by Section 30.11 of Attachment O or Section 23.6 of this Attachment H.

23.4.3.5.4 This Section 23.4.3 shall not restrict the right of any party to make such filing with the Commission as may otherwise be appropriate under the Federal Power Act.

23.4.3.6 Disposition of Penalty Funds

Except as specified in Section 23.4.4.3.2, amounts collected as a result of the imposition of financial penalties shall be credited against costs collectable under Rate Schedule 1 of the ISO Services Tariff.

23.4.4 Load Bid Measure

23.4.4.1 Purpose

As initially implemented, the ISO market rules allow loads to choose to purchase power in either the Day-Ahead Market or in the Real-Time Market, but provide other Market Parties less flexibility in opting to sell their output in the Real-Time Market. As a result of this and other design features, certain bidding practices may cause Day-Ahead LBMPs not to achieve the degree of convergence with Real-Time LBMPs that would be expected in a workably competitive market. A temporary mitigation measure is specified below as an interim remedy if conditions warrant action by the ISO until such time as the ISO develops and implements an effective long-term remedy, if needed. These measures shall only be imposed if persistent unscheduled load causes operational problems, including but not limited to an inability to meet

unscheduled load with available resources. The ISO shall post a description of any such operational problem on its web site.

23.4.4.2 Implementation

23.4.4.2.1 Day-Ahead LBMPs and Real-Time LBMPs in each load zone shall be monitored to determine whether there is a persistent hourly deviation between them in any zone that would not be expected in a workably competitive market. Monitoring of Day-Ahead and real-time LBMPs shall include examination of the following two metrics (along with any additional monitoring tools and procedures that the ISO determines to be appropriate to achieve the purpose of this Section 23.4.4):

(1) The ISO shall compute a rolling average of the hourly deviation of real-time zonal LBMPs from Day-Ahead zonal LBMPs. The hourly deviation shall be measured as: $(\text{zonal LBMP}_{\text{real time}} - \text{zonal LBMP}_{\text{day ahead}})$. Each observation of the rolling-average time series shall be a simple average of all the hourly deviations over the previous four weeks, or such other averaging period determined by the ISO to be appropriate to achieve the purpose of this Section 23.4.4.

(2) The ISO shall also compute the rolling average *percentage* deviation of real-time zonal LBMPs from Day-Ahead zonal LBMPs. This percentage deviation shall be calculated by dividing the rolling-average hourly deviation (defined in Section 23.4.4.2.1 (1) above) by the rolling-average level of Day-Ahead zonal LBMP over the same time period, using the averaging period(s) described in Section 23.4.4.2.1 (1), above.

23.4.4.2.2 The ISO shall also estimate and monitor the average percentage of each Load Serving Entity's load scheduled in the Day-Ahead Market, using a methodology intended to identify a sustained pattern of under-bidding as accurately as the ISO deems practicable. The average percentage will be computed over a specified time period determined by the ISO to be appropriate to achieve the purpose of this mitigation measure.

23.4.4.2.3 If the ISO determines that (i) the relationship between zonal LBMPs in a zone in the Day-Ahead Market and the Real-Time Market is not what would be expected under conditions of workable competition, (ii) one or more Load Serving Entities have been meeting a substantial portion of their loads with purchases in the Real-Time Market, and (iii) that this practice has contributed to an unwarranted divergence of LBMP between the two markets, then the following mitigation measure may be imposed. Any such measure shall be rescinded upon a determination by the ISO that any one or more of the foregoing conditions is not met.

23.4.4.3 Description of the Measure

23.4.4.3.1 The ISO may require a Load Serving Entity engaging in the purchasing practice described above to purchase or schedule all of its expected power requirements in the Day-Ahead Market. A Load Serving Entity subject to this requirement may purchase up to a specified portion of its actual load requirements (the "Allowance Level") in the Real-Time Market without penalty, as determined by the ISO to be appropriate in recognition of the uncertainty of load forecasting.

Commented [PG1]: Should the source of the ICL be considered a load bid.

23.4.4.3.2 Effective with the imposition of the foregoing requirement, all purchases in the Real-Time Market in excess of this Allowance Level (the “Penalty Level”) shall be settled at a specified premium over the applicable zone LBMP. Revenues from such premiums, if any, shall be rebated on a pro *rata* basis to the Market Parties that scheduled energy for delivery to load within New York in the Day-Ahead Market for the day in which the revenues were collected.

23.4.4.3.3 The Allowance Level and the Penalty Level shall be established by the ISO at levels deemed effective and appropriate to mitigate the market effects described in this Section 23.4.4. In addition, the Penalty Level payments shall be waived in any hour in which the Allowance Level is exceeded because of unexpected system conditions.